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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R~J.\.Y- W. ROSEBRAUGH, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Wesley D. Brown, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Ap,pellant, 
vs. 
REX G. BRANCH, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATID!;IENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be desig-
nated as they were in the Court below, where Appellant 
was plaintiff and Respondent was defendant. As plain-
tiff sued in a representative capacity as administrator 
with the will annexed of the Estate of Wesley D. Brown, 
deceased, and as the transaction involved was between 
defendant and said Wesley D. Brown, the latter will for 
convenience sometimes herein be referred to as the de-
cedent. 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant 
to recover an unpaid balance of $2,659.67 assertedly 
due upon a promissory note signed by defendant and 
payable to decedent. The case was tried before the Court 
• sitting without a jury on June 3, 1948, in the District 
Court of Weber County, Utah, the Honorable John A. 
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Hendricks,' Judge, presiding. On J-uly 9, 1948, the Court 
made and entered its Findings rof E,act and Conclusions 
of Law, and thereupon gave judgment in favor of the 
defendant. 
Thereafter1 and within the time . allowed by law, 
namely, on October 1, 1948, plaintiff filed his notice of 
appeal from the adverse judgment, and in due time filed 
the statutory undertaking on appeal. 
r.rHE .PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff's action was based on the following Com-
plaint: 
COMPLAINT 
''Plaintiff complains of the defendant and 
alleges: 
1. That on July 30, 1947, Wesley D. Brown 
, died, and thereafter .the will of said Wesley D. 
Brown was admitted to probate by the District 
Court of Weber (Jounty, Utah; and thereafter, 
by an order of said court duly given and made, 
the plaintiff \vas duly and legally appointed ad-
ministrator with the will annexed of the estate of 
Wesley D. Bro\vn, deceased; and that on the 16th 
day of ()ctober, 1947, he duly qualified as such 
administrator, and letters of administration .with 
the will annexed of said estate were duly and 
legally issued to him; and that he has ever since 
been and now is the duly and legally appointed, 
qualified and acting administrator with will an-
nexed of the estate of Wesley D. Brown, deceased. 
2. That on the 23rd day of .January, 1947, at 
()gden, Weber County, ·utah, the defendant for • 
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Yalue rPel~iYPd, made, executed and delivered to 
the said ,, .... esley ]). Bro,vu, his promissory note 
in '"ri tiug:, hearing date on that day, 'vhich prom-
i~sory note reads in 'vords aud figures following, 
to-,vit: 
$4,100.00 Ogden, Utah 
January 23, -1947 
In installments after date, for value received, 
I promise to pay to the order of 
WESLEY D. BROWN, of Ogden, Utah 
the principal sum of Four Thousand One Hundred 
( $4,100.00) Dollars, "Tithout interest. 
It is understood and agreed, however, that 
monthly installments of One Hundred Fifty and 
no.jlOO ($150.00) Dollars, shall be paid on the 
principal of this note, the first of said install-
ments to be paid on the 15th day of February, 
1947, and one of said installments to be paid on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, 
until the 'Yhole of the unpaid principal has been 
paid. 
And in case default be made in the payment 
of any of said installments of principal' at the 
times and in the manner aforesaid, or within a 
grace period of sixty (60) days, the entire unpaid 
balance of said principal sum shall, at the option 
of the holder of this note, and not otherwise, be-
come due and payable, and notice of the exercise 
of such option is hereby expressly waived. 
. If this note be collected by an attorney, either 
with or without suit, the undersigned agrees to 
pay ten percent additional at attorney's fees. 
Rex G. Branch 
3. That at the time of the appointment of 
plaintiff as administrator with 'viii annexed of 
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said estate, as aforesaid, said note was a part of 
the assets of said estate and the property thereof, 
and the same came into the hands of your plain-
tiff as administrator, as aforesaid, as the prop-
erty of said estate, and plaintiff, as such -ad-
ministrator, has ever since been and now in the 
lawful owner and holder of said promissory note. 
4. That defendant has not paid said note, or 
any part thereof, except that he paid the insta1l-
ments of $150.00 each due thereon for and in the 
months of February, March, April, May, June, 
July and August, 1947, when due, in accordance 
with the terms of said note; and he failed to pay 
the installments which became due on September 
15, October 15, and November 15, 1947, and the 
said note and said installments . were in default, 
and said installment whieh became due on Sep-
tember 15, 194 7, was and remained unpaid and 
in default for more than sixty (60) days, and 
that by the terms of said note, the entire unpaid 
balance of the principal sum of said note, to-wit: 
$3,050.00 thereupon became and· was, on and prior 
to December 3, 1947, due and payable; and that 
on said 3rd day of December, 1947, the defend-
ant paid to the plaintiff the sum of $393.9·3,. which 
sum and: amount plaintiff has applied upon said 
note as follows, to-wit: $3.60 upon the interest 
which became due and owing and accrued upon 
installments then in default, and the balancP of 
$390;22 upon the principal, leaving a balance of 
$2,659.67 due and owing and unpaid; and that 
the same, together with interest thereon from D~­
cemher 3, 1947, at the rate of six (6%) per cent 
per annum, is now wholly due and unpaid and 
justly owing from defendant to plaintiff as ad-
ministrator, as aforesaid. 
5. That on or about said :December 3, 1947, 
defendant notified plaintiff that he would not 
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· make any further payment upon said note and 
\Vould not pay said note or any part or install-
ment thereof, and "·holly repudiated said debt. 
6. 'l,hat by the terms of said note the defend-
ant ag·reed to pay ten (10%) per cent additional 
as attorney'~ fees in the event the note be col-
lected by an attorney; that it has been and is 
necessary for plaintiff to institute this action for 
the collection of said note, and plaintiff has em-
ployed Arthur Woolley, Esq., an attorney of this 
bar, to institute and prosecute this action; that 
10% of the unpaid principal amounts to $265.97. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment 
ag~i;nst the defendant for the sum of $2,659.67, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% 
per annum from December 3, 1947, and for $265.97 
attorney's fees, and for costs of suit.'' 
Defendant demurred generally thereto, which de-
murrer was overruled. 
Thereafter defendant filed the following Answer: 
ANSWER 
"COMms NOW the defendant and for 
answer to plaintiff's complaint admits, denies 
and alleges as follows, to-wit: 
1. Admits Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's com-
plaint. 
2. Admits Paragraph 2 of plaintiff's com-
plaint but alleges that the said note was made, 
executed and delivered by defendant to the said 
Wesley D. Brown by a mutual error of the said 
Wesley D. Brown and the defendant in that the 
amount of the said note should have been 
$1,443.93, instead of t~e sum of $4,100.00, as will 
hereinafter be set forth. 
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3. Defendant admits the allegation of Para-
graph 3 of plaintiff's complaint. 
4. Defendant admits that the only payments 
on the said note made by him were the ones listed 
in Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's complaint but denies 
that any part of the said note or any of said in-
stallments were in default at any time but alleges 
that the error of the defendant and the said 
Wesley D. Brown had been discovered by both 
of said parties and that when the same was dis-
covered, that the said parties attempted to have 
the said error corrected and that the attorney 
for said Wesley D. Brown and the attorney for 
defendant were working on an agreeable settle-
ment of the said note, and that the said parties 
were working on the said adjustment at the time 
of the death of the said Wesley D. Brown, and 
that the defendant paid the said sum of $393.93 to 
the attorney for the said Wesley D. Brown. and 
notified the said attorney that defendant claimed 
the said payment was in full and complete settle-
ment of the said note after adjusting the error 
which had been made by the said Wesley D. 
Brown and this defendant. Defendant denies that 
there is any balance whatsoever due and owing 
and unpaid or due or owing or unpaid form him 
to the plaintiff and denies that the sum of 
$2,659.67 or any sum, together with interest there-
on from Dece·mber 3, 1947, at the rate of 6·% per 
annum or any interest whatsoever is now wholly 
due and unpaid or wholly due or unpaid or due 
or unpaid, and denies that there is anything that 
is justly owing from defendant to plaintiff as 
administrator aforesaid or at all. 
5. Defendant admits the allegation of Para-
graph 5 of plaintiff's rom plaint but alleges in 
connection therewith that he notified the attornev 
of t~e said Wesley D. Bro,vn that the said Wesley 
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D. Bro\vu and defendant had made an error, as 
hereinafter ~et forth, and that the said payment 
of $393.93 \ras payment in full of. all sums due 
from defendant on the said note. 
(i. Defendant denie~ that it has been and is 
necessary or has been or is necessary for the 
plaintiff to institute this action for the collection 
of said note, but alleges that the said note has 
been paid in full, and denies that there is any 
unpaid principal and denies that 10% of the un-
paid principal amounts to $265.97 or any sum or 
that there is any attorney fee due .from defend-
ant. 
7. Defendant denies each and every allega-
tion of plaintiff's complaint except that which 
has heretofore been expressly admitted or denied. 
And as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's 
complaint, defendant alleges: 
1. That on the 9th day of December, 1946, 
the defendant and the said W. D. Brown entered 
into' a written contract wherein and whereby the 
said W. D. Brown agreed to sell to the said de-
fendant the business of the said W. D. Brown 
known as the Brown Brokerage Company, with 
offices in the Kiesel Building at Ogden, Utah, for 
the sum of $6,600.00; and it was mutually agreed 
by and between the two said parties that the 
total purchase price of the said sale and purchase 
would be the aYerage income of the said W. D. 
Brown from the said Brown Brokerage business 
for the previous five years, and that the said 
W. D. Brown through an error on his part, 
stated that his total income from the said broker-
age business for 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946 
amounted to the total sum of $33,322.76, or an 
average per year of $6,664.55, and that the said 
W. D. Brown stated to the defendant that in order 
'1 
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to make the account even that be \\·ould drop the 
$64.55 and call the average for the five years 
$6,600.00, and that the defendant, knowing that 
the said W. ]). Brown was strictly honest and 
reliable, accepted the said figures, and, not know-
ing that the said W. D. Brown had made an error 
in the figures, submitted by the said W. D. Brown, 
defendant thereupon signed the said note re-
ferred to in plaintiff's complaint in the sum of 
$4,100.00. And defendant alleges that the true 
and correct figures for the years 1942, 1943, 1944, 
1945 and 1946 was the sum of $19,719.63, or an 
average yearly income of $3,943.93, which said 
sum was intended by both the said W. D·. Brown 
and the defendant to be the purchase· price for 
the said Brown Brokerage business. And defend-
ant alleges that he paid the sum of $2,500~00 to 
the said W. D. Brown, leaving the amount prop-
erly due the said W. D. Brown in the sum of 
$1,443.93. Defendant further alleges that the 
s.aid error of the said W. D. Brown bad been 
caused by the said W. D. Brown inadvertently 
including a substantial number of receipts from 
other sources that were in no way connected with 
the Brown Brokerage business, as the books of 
account of the said W. D. Brown and the Brown 
Brokerage Company business clearly show and 
as the other records kept by the said W. D. 
Brown also show. 
2. And defendant alleges that in addition to 
the said $2,500.00 paid by him to the said W. D. 
Brown, he has paid on the said account the sum 
of $1,443.93, making the total amount paid by 
the defendant of $3,943.93, being the amount due 
on the said account of the full amount that de-
fendant was to pay for the said business. 
3. And defendant alleges that the said note 
referred to in plaintiff's complaint ''rould not 
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ha\·e been signed by him and \vould not haYe been 
accepted by the said \V. D. Bro\vn had the two 
said parties kno\YU of the error, but that the said 
note \\·ould ha Ye been for the correct amount of 
$1,443.83 and that the terms of the said note 
should no\Y bl) corrected by this court to show 
the true and correct intention of the two said 
parties and the true aud correct amount of 
$1,±±3.93, and that after the correction of the said 
note, that the same should be declared by this 
court to be fully paid by this defendant and the 
same discharged. 
\\"'"HEREFORE, the defendant prays that 
plaintiff take nothing by virtue of his complaint, 
but that the same be dismissed and that judg-
ment be granted for the defendant for all costs 
of this action and for such further order and re-
lief as should be just and equitable.'' 
THE ISSUES 
The execution and delivery of the contract of sale, 
and the promissory note given in completion of the 
contract is admitted. That while the promissory note 
was in the principal amount of $4,100.00, only some 
fourteen hundred odd dollars were paid thereon, and 
defendant repudiated it as to the balance is likewise 
admitted. 
Defendant's defense to the action lies solely in his 
assertion of a mutual mistake of himself and decedent 
as to the total price to be paid under the contract. His 
theory, as evidenced by his answer, and by his counsel's 
statement to the lower Court (Tr. 33), is that the agree-
ment was that the ''business'' was to be sold for a price 
representing the average of its previous five years 
earnings, namely $3,943.93 ; that decedent, in seeking to 
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ascertain what this average five year earning figure 
was, inadvertently included therein items of income other 
than from the brokerage business, and hence inadvert-
ently arrived at the figure of $6,60of.oo, instead of 
$3,943.93, and by reason thereof the figure of $6,600f00 
was mistakenly used as the contract price, instead of 
$3,943.9,3. That as defendant has paid the sum of 
$3,-943.93, he has discharge( t iu full his obligations to 
decedent and decedent's estate. 
It should be borne in mind that no claim of fraud 
or misrepresentation is made but only the claim of 
mutual mistake of the parties, not of the sc-rivener. 
Defendant did no.t seek rescission of the contract, but 
the ease apparently was tried upon the theo.ry of the 
defendant's seeking a reformation of the note to reflect 
the principal thereof as $1,443.9~3, rather than $4,100.00. 
The lower court's pretrial order limited the issues 
as follows: 
"It is therefore ordered that the only matter 
to be tried is whether or not there was a mutual 
mistake as to the price to be paid for the broker-
age business.'' 
While under some circumstances there may be, in 
the case of mutual mistake, the al terna.tive remedies of 
rescission or reformation, we need not here concern our-
selves with legal principles involved in cases of rescis-
si<:>'n, because plaintiff neither s-ought such relief, nor 
took the fun dam en tal steps of notice of rescission and 
restoration of statu quo essential. to seeking relief by 
way of rescission. We are left, aceordingly, with the 
single question of his right, under the evidence in this 
case, to reformation of the note sued upon to Hhow the 
principal thereof as $1,443.93, i11stead of $4,100.00. 
10 
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The decedent ('Yho died on July 30, 1947) for many 
years prior to hi8 death 'vas the sole owner of a broker-
age business in Ogden, U tab, \Yhich he operated under 
the name of Bro,vn Brokerage Company, and which, at 
the time of the transaction 've are here concerned with, 
had its office at 401 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah. The 
office 'Yas shared "ith one George Harding Horsley, 
"-ho 'vas eng·aged in an independent business. Decedent 
and Mr. Horsley had a common seeretary, one Joan 
Klissinger (Tr. 5 and 6). Decedent had income other 
than that derived from his brokerage business, namely, 
salary as manager of Western Gateway Storage Com-
pany, a corporation, and various stock investments. 
In the late fall of 1946, and primarily because of 
failing health, decedent decided to- sell his brokerage 
business. Defendant became interested in purchasing 
the same, and on December 9, 1946, decedent and defend-
ant entered into the follo,ving contract for the purchase 
by the defendant of the brokerage business, together 
with the furniture, furnishings and supplies used in 
connection therewith, for the total purchase price of 
$6,600.00 (Exhibit 9): 
"CONTRACT 
THIS AGREE1tiENT, made this 9th day of 
December, 1946, by and between W .. D. BR.OWN 
of Ogden, Weber County, Utah, heremafter called 
the First Party, and REX G. BRANCH of Lake 
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WI T N E S S E T H: 
WHEREAS, First Party is the owner of that 
certain brokerage business gene1·ally known and 
described as BROWN BROKERAGE COM-
pANY with offices in the Kiesel Building, Ogden, 
Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Second Party is desirous of 
purchasing from First Party the business of the 
said Brown Brokerage Company upon the terms 
and conditiollS hereinafter set forth, 
NOW, -THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
MUTUALLY AGREE.D by and between the 
parties hereto as follow-s : 
1. Second Party hereby agrees to purchase 
from First Party, and First Party hereby agrees 
to sell to Second Party for the sum of Six Thous-
and Six Hundred ($6,600.00) Dollars, First 
Party's brokerage business, which operates un-
der the name and style of Brown Brokerage Com-
pany, together with the good will thereof, and all 
furniture, furnishings and supplies used by First 
Party in connection therewith and now located 
in the offices of said Company in the Kiesel 
Building in Ogden, Utah. 
The said purchase price of Six Thousand Six 
Hundred ($6,600.00) Dollars is to be paid as 
follows: Five Hundred ($500.00) -Dollars upon 
the execution of this agreement, and Two Thous-
and ($2,000.00) Dollars on or before January 15, 
1947, and the balance of Four Thousand One 
Hundred ($4,100.00) Dollars in monthly install-
ments of not less than One Hundred · Fifty 
($150.00) Dollars each, payable on the 15th day 
of each month commencing with February 15, 
1947. Upon the payment of the said sum of Two 
Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars on or prior to Jan-
12 
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uary 15. lD-!7, 8eeond Party ,vill be entitled to 
take posse~~ion of ~aid business, and thereafter 
operate it as his O\\~u, and upon the payment of 
~aid sum of T"\vo Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars 
8Pcond Party agrees to execute and deliver to 
Fir~t Party his promissory note in the principal 
sum of Four Thousand One Hundred ($4,100.00) 
Dollars representing· the then unpaid balance on 
the purchase price of Six Thousru1d Six Hundred 
($6,600.00) Dollars, 'vhic.h said note shall, by its 
terms, be payable in monthly installments of One 
Hundred Fifty ( $150.00) Dollars, the first install-
ment . being payable on or before February 15, 
1947. No interest "'"ill accrue upon any deferred 
payments. 
2. As of the date of the payment of said Two 
Thousand ( $2,000.00) Dollars, First Party shall 
retain for his own benefit-all of the then existing 
accounts receivable of said business, and shall 
pay and discharge all accounts payable as of 
that date. 
3. As a further consideration for the pur-
chase of said business by Second Pary, First 
Party agrees that during the year 1947 he will 
hold himself available to Second Party for con-
sultation and advice with respect to the operation 
by said Second Party of said business. 
+. In the event of default by the Second Party 
in the performance of any of the covenants or 
agreement on his part to be performed, and such 
default continues for a period of sixty (60) days, 
then and in that event First Party may, at his 
option declare the entire amount then unpaid to 
be due and payable, and may avail himself of any 
remedy provided by law for enforcement thereof, 
or he may, at his option, declare this executory 
Contract of Sale forfeited ·and retake possession 
18 
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of the said brokerage business, in which event all 
payments theretofore made by Second Party to 
First Party shall be retained by :E1 irst Party as 
liquidated damages for breach by Second Party 
of this Contract. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties here-
to have hereunto set their hands the day and year 
first above written. 
W. D. BROWN /s/ 
FIRST PARTY 
REX G. BRANCH /s/ 
SECOND PARTY" 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract defendant 
paid to decedent the cash amounts of $2,500.00 therein 
referred to, and on January 23, 1947, gave his promis-
sory note to decedent in the principal amount of 
$4,100.00, a.s the balance of the purchase price of 
$6,600.00 (Exhibit A.) The note is set out in full in 
plaintiff's complaint, Page 3 hereof. Upon delivery 
of the note, defendant took over the business in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract, and thereafter paid 
upon the principal of the note $1,443.93, and refused to 
pay the balance thereof in the principal amount of 
$2,656.07. In the meantime dec-edent had died, and 
plaintiff appointed administrator with the will annexed 
of his estate. Demand was made by plaintiff for pay-
ment of the balance in accordance with the terms of the 
note, and defendant advised plaintiff he would make no 
other or further payments thereon. (See allegations and 
admissions in pleadings.) 
Thereupon this action was brought. Defendant's 
only defense thereto was mutual mistake a.s to the 
amount. His contentions in this regard are quite de-
tailed in his Answer, but it is the evidence in support 
thereof we are concerned with. 
14 
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'The "·itlH_~~~ Hor~l«2y, \vho ~bared office ~pace with 
deeedeut, te~tified that in the latter part of December, 
19-l-t), decedent told him that he had signed a contract 
,rith defendant to sell him the business and he (the 
decedent) H ~aid that they had gone hack and were tak-
ing the t~arniug~ of the brokerage company during the 
past fiYe year period and then dividing them by five 
to get them ou a fi\·e year average, and on that basis 
he '"a~ ~elling the businesB to 1Ir. Branch." (Tr. 7 and 
8). 
The "?itnes~ Joan Kruitmoe~ (formerly Klissinger) 
testified that H around the last of December, 1946," 
(Tr. 13) decedent asked her to take from the books· 
(Exhibits 1 and :2) '~some figures" (Tr. 12) for the 
years 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946, ''and then get 
the yearly average for five years.'' ( Tr. 13) That de-
cedent tald her to take her figures from the ''Bank'' 
column w.-hich she did (Tr. 14). That she was unable 
to take the figures for 1942, but she did for the years 
1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, copied them on Exhibit 3, 
averaged them, and gave E,xhibit 3 to decedent. Only 
the typewritten figures on Exhibit 3 were hers. (Tr. 
14-15). No explana tiou of the pencil figures on Ex-
hibit 3 \Yas offered, but it is obvious they were added 
subsequently, to compare the ''Bank'' column figures 
with the ''Brokerage'' column figures. Who put them 
there or when was uot shown. 
The \vitness H·. J-. Corkey identified himself as an 
accountant who audited decedent's books (Exhibits 1 
and 2) for income tax ~purposes, and from which books 
he prepared decedent's income tax returns. He gave it 
as his judgment that from Exhibits 1 and 2 the gross 
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earning·s from the brokerage business for the years 1942 
through 1946 wa.s $19,719.63, or an average of $3,943.93 
per year ( Tr. 29). 
The foregoing is, in effect all of the evidence in the 
case, and upon which the Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment in favor of defendant is based. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES 
1. The lower Court erred in finding as facts the 
matters set out in that portion of Paragraph 1 of the 
Findings of Fact reading a.s follows: 
"* * *, but the eourt finds that the said 
amount is not owing, and that there is no interest 
owing, and that there is now nothing due and 
owing from defendant to the plaintiff as adminis-
trator, as set forth in plaintiff's complaint." 
2. The lower court erred in finding as facts the 
matters set out in Paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact, 
and the whole thereof. 
3. That the lower court erred in reaching its several 
conclusions of law, and each thereof. 
4. The lower court erred in granting judgment 
against the plaintiff and dismissing his complaint. 
THE ARGUMENT 
The several assignments of error can, in the in-
terests of brevity, be considered, at least to a large 
extent, together, as they all relate to the insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings, the conclusions 
or the judgment. 
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'fhLl fundcuneutal quP~tious iHvol\·~d are (1) \vhether 
there i~ L...,·uffic'ieut eompeteut evidenee in the record to 
e~tablish that the eoutraet prieP of $6,600.00 was in-
8erted in the eoutract through mutual mistake of the 
decedent and defenda11t ~ and ( 2) ''Thether: there is 
~ufficie-nt eompeteut P\~idence in the record to show 
that the eontraet price the decedent and defendant 
mutually intended \Ya8 $3,943.93. 
We U8e the phra8e ··sufficient competent evidence'' 
advisedly, because in a ca8e of this sort "any competent 
evidence'' i8 not enoug·h. In this regard we invite the 
attention of this court to the rule en uncia ted by it in the 
case of. Weight v Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 J>. 899, as 
follows: 
~'A comprehensive view of the whole evi-
dence doe8 not establish appellant's claim with 
that degree of certainty \vhich, by all the courts 
of equity, has always been held essential to 
authorize the reformation of a wrj.tten instrument 
upon the ground of fraud or mistake. In order 
to~ authorize a court to reform a written instru-
ment, the presumptiou that the instrument cor-
rectly evidences the agreemeut of the parties, 
where reformation is resisted, must be overcome 
by proof which is clear and convincing. As is 
well said by the author in 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 
( 3rd Ed.) section 859 : 
'Court8 of equity do not grant the high 
remedy of reformation upon a probability, 
nor ev~n upon a mere preponderance of evi-
dence, but only upon a certainty of the 
error.' '' 
Also to the case of Uram et al vs Reynolds et al, 55 
·utah 384, 186 P. 100, as follo\V8 : 
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''Mutual mistakes can be corrected, and 
courts will reform a contract so as to express 
what the parties actually agreed upon and make 
it express the terms upon which the minds of 
both parties met. The law on the subject is well 
established in this jurisdiction. If the same mis-
take be made by both parties, the contract may 
be rectified, but the proof must be clear and 
distinct, as courts do not make contracts for 
parties. To secure reformation of a written con-
tract which is presumed to be the real contract 
and to contain all the terms agreed upon, the 
party seeking relief and demanding reformation 
· of the contract must establish the mutual mistake 
by evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and con-
vincing, and not merely by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 
159 Pac. 534; Weight v. Bailey, 45 Utah, 584, 
147, Pac. 899; Deseret National Bank v. Din-
woodey et al, 17 Utah, 43, 53 Pac. 215; Ewing v. 
Keith,.16 Utah, 312, 52 Pac. 4. The only question 
involved in this case is ~Thether the proof pro-
duced by appellants, considered in connection 
with that offered by respondents, measures up to 
the required standard. The answer to this ques-
tion necessitates a review of the testimony.'' 
However, before considering the evidence in this 
case to the end of ascertaining if it measures up to the 
standards there imposed, it is deemed advisable to have 
in mind other fundamental principles of law relating to 
the reformation of written instruments. 
First. The Mistake Must Be Mutual. 
This principle is well stated in 45 Am. Jur. at page 
617 as follows : 
''Indeed, when no question of fraud, bad 
faith, or inequitable conduct is involved and the 
right to reform an instrument is based solely on 
a mistake, it is necessary that the mistake be 
mutual, and that both parties understood the 
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contract a~ the eon1plaiut or petition alleges it 
ought to haYt_) been, and a~ in fact it was except 
for the mistake; aud this iH ~o wheth~r the mis-
takP i~ one of fact or one of law, or one of law 
and fact mix~d. Other"·ise stated, a unilateral 
mistake is not ordinarily gTound for reformation, 
the remedy in the case thereof being rescission. 
rrbe court cannot rewrite the contract which the 
parties haYe made so a~ to express an agreement 
"'"hich they did not enter into.'' ( 45 Am. J ur. 
page 617) 
Second. What C'onstitutes Mutual Mistake. 
'' ... \. mutual mistake is one which is reciprocal 
End common to both parties, each alike laboring 
under the same misconception in respect to the 
terms of the "'Titten instrument. A mutual mis-
take of their agents is not necessarily a mistake 
of the parties.'' (45 Am. Jur., Pg. 618) 
Thi~rd. J!istake of Fact. 
"'A mistake of fact which is ground for ap-
propriate relief in equity consists in (1) an un-
conscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact 
past or present and material to the contract; or 
(2) belief in the present existence of· a thing ma-
terial to the contract which does not exist, or in 
the past existence of such a thing which has not 
existed. The essential element of mistake is a 
mental condition, conception, or conviction of the 
understanding either in a passive or active state. 
When passive, it may consist of unconsciousness, 
ignorance, or forgetfulness; and when active, 
there must be a belief. The first condition must 
al,vays concern a. fact material to the trans-
action, while in the second the belief may be that 
a matter or thing exists at the time which really 
does not exist or that it has existed at some past 
time, when it did not in fact exist. All particular 
errors v.rhich fall under either condition are mis-
takes of fact and grounds for equitable relief." 
(45 Am. Jur., Page 610). 
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Fourth. Ignorance. 
''Where parties to an agreement are ignor-
ant of facts which, if known, would have caused 
a different contract, the remedy is not refor-
mation, but rescission. The difficulty in decree-
ing reformation in such case is that the minds of 
the parties did not meet upon the contract in the 
form in which it is sought to be put.'' ( 45 Am. 
J ur., Page 611) 
Fifth. Real Agreement. 
''The high remedy of reformation is never 
granted on a probability, or on a mere prepon-
derance of evidence. The strict requirements 
relate not only to the mistake and the mutuality 
thereof or to the fraud alleged, but also to the 
real agreement which is alleged to have been 
made." (45 Am. Jur., Pg. 651). 
While defendant in his affirmative defense pleaded 
many asserted facts relating to the questions involved, 
we are here only concerned with the evidence. As the 
two principal questions involved are ( 1) that the price 
of $6,600.00 was inserted in the contract as a result of 
the mutual mistake of decedent and defendant, and (2) 
the intended figure was $3,943.93, we view the evidence 
in its relationship to those two matters. 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS NO·T SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THAT THE DECEDENT AND DE:FENDANT MADE 
A MUTUAL MISTAKE: IN FIXING THE PRICE AT 
$6,600.00 IN THE C.ONTRACT. 
Clear and convincing evidence of a mistake on the 
part of both decedent and defendant is necessary. What 
is the evidence in this regard~ 
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( )uly t\Yo \\·ituesstls testified on this phaSl1 of the 
case. namely, Hor~dey and ICruitmoes. Horsle)·· testi-
fied that long after the contract \\'a~ signed, namely, in 
late December, 1~)46, deeedent told him that 
'·they had ~.!:uue baek aud \Vere taking the 
earnings of the hrokerage eompany Juring- the 
pa~t fiYe-year period and then dividing them by 
.~) to get them on a five-~·ear average, and on that 
ba~is he \ras ~elliug thl1 busiues~ to 1\fr. Branch.'' 
(Tr. 8) 
Such is the extent of Horsley's testimony as the the 
basis of the sale. What is its effect~ Bearing in mind 
that the written contract "·as signed some weeks prior 
thereto, 'Yhat meaning can intelligently be given to this 
asserted statement by dec-edent f Certainly nothing 
more- than that at that time, "'reeks after the contract 
was signed, he felt that the contract price of the business 
reflected an amount comparable to the average earnings 
of the business. for its previous five years. No inti-
mation can be derived therefrom that decedent was sel-
ling the business, p.Zus the other ·items covered by the 
co·ntract of sale, for such average of earnings. It simply 
reflects a then belief on decedent's part that the con-
tract price of $6,600.00 approximated the average earn-
ings of the business. This is a far cry from clear and 
convincing proof that decedent, at the time the contract 
was signed some weeks before the conversation with 
Horsley, intended to sell the business for a price equal-
ling such average earnings, rather than for the price 
stipulated in the contract. 
The testimony of the other witness, Joan Kruit-
moes, was simply to the effect that in late December, 
1946, weeks after the contract was signed, decedent asked 
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her to take the total of the ''Bank Column'' figures 
from his books for the previous five years and average 
them. He said nothing to her of any sale of the business 
to defendant, or why he wanted them. The most obvious 
explanation of why he wanted them, and it, of course is 
purely speculative, as any other explanation must be, 
was that it was the end of the year and he wanted in-
formation as to how his 1946 income compared with 
that of previous years. Certainly there was no rele-
vancy between the decedent's asking his bookkeeper for 
information as to his total income for the years, and the 
matter of price for which the brokerage business, plus 
furniture, furnishings, supplies and good will previously 
had been sold. 
Of particular significance is the fact that no testi-
mony whatever was offered by defendant himself. True 
it is that there might have been objection raised to 
testimony by him of matters equally within his know-
ledge and that of decedent, but, as such is an objection 
that might have been waived by plaintiff, it is strange 
that his testimony was not at least offered. Also, as 
we have pointed out, the mistake must have been mutual, 
and it is not enough that the decedent alone was in error. 
Without defendant's testimony there is a total blank 
as to mistake on defendant's part. 
What was defendant's position in this regard 1 At 
the time the c.ontract was signed was he laboring under 
the impression that the $6,600.00 figure represented the 
averag·e earnings from the businss ~ Had he himself 
examined the books~ Was he relying wholly on what 
decedent might have told him~ As to these matters 
the record is entirely silent. Defendant alleged in his 
Answer that he relied on decedent's statements as 
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to earnings. but \\·here is the proof thereofJ! Defend-
aut's failure to te~tify as to these matters of necessity 
is fatal to his elaim, for as the record stands, there is 
no proof \vhateYt~r of mistak~ on defendant's part which 
is essential to his right of reformation. 
We submit, accordingly, that there is not only lack-
ing the clear and convincing eviden.ce of mutual mistake 
necessary to invoke a reformation, but there is lacking 
any evidence whateYer of mistake. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT· TO. S·HOW 
WHAT THE REAL AGREEMENT WAS 
~\_s we have previously shown, the burden was on 
defendant to sho"-r by clear and convincing proof not 
only that the parties mutually made a mistake in the 
agreement as written, but also the real agreement as 
made. 
It is not disputed that the property purchased con-
sisted of the business, ''together with the good will 
thereof, and all furniture, furnishings and supplies.'' 
Defendant's contention is that the agreed price for the 
whole thereof \Yas $3,943.93, and the lower court so 
found, although there is not a scintilla of evidence to 
support such finding. For the court to find that the 
agreed contract price for all of the property contracted 
for was $3,943.93 is not only to find contrary to the 
express stipulations of the contract, but also contrary 
to the evidence. 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
General principles of the law relating to reformation 
of instruments govern in this case. Those principles 
are (1) there must have been a mistake in inserting the 
figure of $6,600.00 in the contract as· the price for the 
business, plus the other items sold under the contract; 
( 2) the mistake must have been mutual ; ( 3) the in-
tended figure of $3,943.93 must qe established; ( 4) 
proof of all of these matters must be clear and convinc-
Ing. 
Applying these principles to this case, the judg-
ment of the lower court must be reversed. 
First. Because there is no clear and convincing 
proof, or any proof, that decedent made any mistake. 
Second. Because there is no clear and convincing 
proof that defendant made any mistake. (No evidence 
on this even offered) ; 
Third. There is no elear and convincing proof, or 
any proof, that the truly intended price of both decedent 
and defendant was $3,943.93 as found by the court. 
The lower court in granting judgment as it did in 
effect made a new contract for the parties, with no 
evidence whatever before it that such was the contract 
the parties thereto truly intended. In doing· so it wholly 
disregarded the written instrument the parties of their 
own volition signed, and by speculation based solely 
upon controverted assertions in defendant's answer, 
with no proof whatever in support thereof, determined 
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that decedent, \vho i~ d~ad and couldn't testify, and de~ 
fendant, "·ho "·a~ alive but "·ouldn't testify, intended 
other than a~ th~y themselve::; provided in their writte11 
instrument. 
We submit tha.t the judgment of the lower court 
must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR WOOLLEY 
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD 
Attorneys fo~r Appellant 
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